Abstract. We investigate here concept learning from incomplete examples. Our first purpose is to discuss to what extent logical learning settings have to be modified in order to cope with data incompleteness.
Introduction
This work finds its origins in a molecular biology problem: the search for a secondary substructure found on most molecules of a set of RNA sequences. In this problem the data presented an extreme form of incompleteness: the structural information about the sequences is ambiguous as for each sequence many structures could be the real one. A framework addressing such a situation has been presented in [Bouthinon and Soldano, 1998 ]. This first work led us to a more general investigation of incompleteness of examples in concept learning frameworks, and more precisely, we investigate here the effect of incompleteness on the logical settings for concept learning. We do not propose any concept learning algorithm, however we address various theoretical and practical issues concerning such algorithms.
Usually concept learning from examples relies on a membership relation between hypotheses and examples denoted as cover and such that to be a solution an hypothesis has to cover positive examples and should not cover negative examples of the target concept [De Raedt, 1997] . This set of solutions, inheriting its partial order from the Hypothesis language is called the Version Space [Mitchell, 1982] of the learning problem. This definition of concept learning relies on a complete description of the examples. In [Hirsh, 1994] , the author proposes to slightly extend the notion of solution in order to use any piece of information concerning the current example set. In this view, the definition of concept learning problems 2 has also to be modified: a hypothesis has now to be compatible with any piece of information related to an example of the current learning set.
Our central interrogation, following Hirsh, is what are the consequences of incompleteness in examples on the solutions of a concept learning problem? We argue hereafter that there exists two basic kind of incompleteness: abstraction and uncertainty that can also be mixed up. The definition of compatibility will then depend on the nature of incompleteness of examples. We will generically say that a candidate hypothesis has to be compatible with both positive and negative incomplete examples and we will define compatibility as a pair of relations (compatible + , compatible -) in such a way that a candidate hypothesis has to be compatible + with positive examples and compatible -with negative examples. In order to illustrate these notions, we consider examples of the concept fly. Each example is a bird that can be described with the following features: it is light or not-light, it is migratory or not-migratory, and it has one and only one color (either red or green). Here a hypothesis covers a complete example if all features of the hypothesis belong to the example.
Pure abstraction leads to generalized examples. A generalized example is represented by only part of the complete description of the example. This part is supposed to represent a sufficient amount of information to determine the label of the example. As a consequence such an example corresponds to a set of complete examples. A hypothesis is then compatible + with a positive generalized example if it covers all the corresponding positive complete examples.
Let us consider a green light migratory bird, considered as a positive example. Let us suppose that concerning this particular bird we know that its label (i.e. positive) does not depend on its color, thus resulting in the generalized example light migratory. The hypothesis light or red is compatible + with our example as the hypothesis covers both completed examples green light migratory and red light migratory. In the same way a hypothesis is c o m p a t i b l e -with a negative generalized example if it covers none of the corresponding negative complete examples. Here light or red is not compatible -with the generalized negative example not-light migratory as light or red does cover one of the corresponding complete examples, namely red not-light not-migratory. In this last case the hypothesis is correctly rejected though complete description of our negative example (that includes green) would fail to reject the hypothesis.
Note that here compatible+ is not the negation of compatible -and so we do need a pair of relations rather than a unique coverage relation.
Uncertainty appears when the values of some features are unknown (and cannot be determined) when describing an example. Whenever uncertainty concerns the part of the description that would be sufficient to determine the label of the example, we have to deal with both abstraction and uncertainty. An uncertain generalized example is then represented as a set of possible generalized examples. One of these generalized examples corresponds to our observed example. A hypothesis is then c o m p a t i b l e with such an example if it is compatible with at least one possible generalized example. Let us consider again the two examples mentioned above but consider that we do not know whether they are light or notlight. Our positive example is now represented as the two possible generalized examples light migratory and not-light migratory. When checking the hypothesis stating that light or red birds fly we observe that the hypothesis is compatible + with the first possible generalized example light migratory. As a consequence, light or red is compatible + with our uncertain generalized example {{light, migratory}, {not-light, migratory}}. Our negative example is now represented as the same uncertain generalized example {{light, migratory}, {not-light, migratory}}. Our hypothesis is also compatible -with the second possible generalized example {not-light, migratory} and as a consequence the hypothesis is compatible with our negative uncertain generalized example.
Our first purpose here is to define a logical learning setting to deal with incomplete examples.
We start from the Learning from interpretations learning setting defined in [De Raedt and Dehaspe, 1997a] . Learning from interpretations extends to first order languages the basic propositional learning setting to which most attribute-value concept learning methods are related. We then define Learning from Possibilities that extends learning from interpretations to cope with uncertain generalized examples illustrated above. In [De Raedt, 1997] , the author defines Learning from satisfiability and shows that the main logical learning settings, as learning from interpretations and learning by entailment, reduce to (i.e. may be seen, after applying a transformation, as special cases of) Learning from satisfiability. We show here that
Learning from Satisfiability in turn reduces to Learning from Possibilities and discuss issues related to the class of hypotheses that are investigated.
The second purpose of the paper is to discuss a particular case of learning from Possibilities that we denote as Assumptions based Learning. Here the purpose is to use some information about the example that lies outside its description, as designed in a learning task, in order to reduce the uncertainty of the example. We discuss the role of local and background knowledge in Assumptions based Learning and discuss various properties concerning the case in which hypotheses are DNF formulas containing only positive literals (for instance H = ∃xy
We briefly discuss our solution [Bouthinon and Soldano, 1999 ] to a RNA secondary structure prediction problem as an illustration of
Assumptions based Learning, and we discuss practical issues related to this real-world problem.
Finally we discuss previous work addressing data incompleteness. In particular we discuss handling of Missing Values in propositional concept learning methods, and integration of abduction and induction in Inductive Logic Programming.
Preliminaries

Learning and classification of incomplete examples
In the Version space view of noise free concept learning from examples, as proposed by T.
Mitchell [Mitchell, 1982] , each example, either positive or negative, acts as a constraint that eliminates some hypotheses from the concept space. The version space Sol(E) is then the set of solutions of the concept learning task, given the current set E of positive and negative examples. Following Hirsh [Hirsh, 1994] we argue that such a constraint can represent any piece of information that shrinks the version space. In our view a (possibly incomplete)
example precisely is such a piece of information extracted from some observation. To express concept learning in this more general view we use the following notion of compatibility that relates hypotheses to examples:
Definition: A hypothesis H is compatible with an example whenever this example does not eliminate the hypothesis H from the Version Space.
As a consequence, the set of solutions (i.e. the Version space) of a noise free concept learning problem is defined as the set of hypotheses that are c o m p a t i b l e with all the (possibly . However we will further see that this constraint has to be relaxed when dealing with incomplete examples.
The basic property of the Version space is that hypotheses are monotonically rejected when some new complete example e is provided. This basic property that holds for complete examples should still hold for incomplete examples. We consider here that some new constraint c on the learning set is provided thus turning E in E'= E ∪{c}. Such a constraint corresponds either to a new (possibly incomplete) example or to some new information reducing uncertainty on a previous example, or generalizing some previous example. Anyway
Monotonicity of Elimination has to be preserved:
Definition (Monotonicity of Elimination):
A hypothesis eliminated from the version space corresponding to a learning set E will stay outside the Version Space whatever new constraint c is added to the learning set E.
To further discuss concept learning from incomplete examples, we will use a generic learning setting definition relying on the compatibility relation. The compatibility relation will depend on the nature of incompleteness of examples:
Definition : (Generic Learning setting):
H is a solution to the learning problem associated to the learning set E divided into positive occur: positive and negative classification being both consistent or none of them being consistent with the selected hypothesis. Consistency will be expressed using the compatibility relations:
Definition: (Consistency):
-Positive classification of an instance i is consistent (with the selected hypothesis H) whenever H is compatible + with the instance.
-Negative classification of an instance i is consistent (with the selected hypothesis H) whenever H is compatible -with the instance.
This leads to the following generic classification setting:
Definition (Generic classification setting):
A new instance is classified as -Positive whenever positive classification is consistent and negative classification is not.
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-Negative whenever negative classification is consistent and positive classification is not.
-Uncertain, whenever both positive and negative classification are consistent.
-Contradictory, whenever neither positive nor negative classification is consistent.
As we will further see, uncertain classification happens when instances are uncertain, and contradictory classification happens when instances are abstracted.
In what follows we consider as hypotheses, formulas of a logical language. Constraints on a hypothesis concerns which interpretations should be or not models of the hypothesis.
Logic
In this paper we focus on Inductive Logic Programming frameworks [Flach, 1992; Muggleton, 1992; De Raedt 1997] where examples and hypothesis are formalized in logical languages. We present in hereunder syntactical and semantic elements of logic (see [Nienhuys-Cheng and Wolf, 1997 ] chapters 2 and 3 for details) useful to describe the logical learning settings presented hereafter. All these settings are based on a first-order language L whose syntax and semantics are described below. Note that the reader is supposed to be familiar with basic foundations of logics.
Syntax
From a syntactic point of view L is based on a set of predicates P , a set of variables V, no functional symbols other than a set of constants HU, the logical relations {∧, ∨, ←} and the positive literal a will often be written a← , and a negative literal ¬a will be written a← . In this paper we only consider universally quantified clauses, i.e. clauses in which all variables appearing in a clause are in the scope of a universal quantifier∀. For instance the clause∀x ∀y (p(x) ← q(x,y)) will be written∀(p(x) ← q(x,y)) or even p(x)← q(x,y). A clausal theory is a conjunction of universally quantified clauses ∀c 1 ∧…∧ ∀c q (each c i is a clause), which will be also denoted as a set of clauses {c 1 ; …;c q }. We also call CNF formulas such clausal theories.
Let us define a cube as a conjunction of literals ¬a 1 ∧…∧ ¬a m ∧ b 1 ∧…∧ b n (where a i and b j are atoms). We will call DNF formula a disjunction of existentially quantified cubes as ∃ d 1 ∨… ∨ ∃d q (where each d i is a cube). For instance ∃x∃y(¬p(x) ∧ q(y)) ∨ ∃ z r(z) is a DNF formula. A DNF + formula is a DNF formula with no negative literal.
Note that a cube is the negation of a clause (and conversely), and a DNF formula is the negation of a CNF formula (and conversely).
Any CNF or DNF formula (and more specifically a clause, a cube or a literal) is said ground when it contains no variables (in such a case quantifiers are irrelevant).
Semantics
The semantics says how to assign a truth value (either TRUE or FALSE) to a formula.
In this paper we will focus on Herbrand interpretations that are based on a specific domain of interpretation, called a Herbrand universe and that simply is the set of constants HU. HU is the semantic domain used to interpret terms (constant and variables): a constant c of HU is 6 interpreted as itself, and any variable v is interpreted as an element e of HU thanks to the substitution {v/e}. Thus given a non quantified formula f having q variables {v 1 , …,v q }, fθ is a ground formula iff θ = { v 1 /e 1 , …,v q /e q } substitutes each occurrence of each variable v k in f with the element e k of HU. For instance consider HU={a,b}, then light(a) ← red(a) is a ground formula built from light(x) ← red(x) applying the substitution θ = {x/a}.
Let us define the Herbrand base HB as the set of ground atoms that can be formed from the predicates in P and the constants in HU. A Herbrand interpretation i assigns a truth value to each ground atom of HB. i divides HB into the set i p of true ground atoms (with truth value TRUE) and the set i n containing false ones (with truth value FALSE). For instance consider HU = {a,b} and P = {light, red, green} in which each predicate is unary, then HB = {light(a),
, green(b)} and i n = {red(b), green(a)}. Note that from HB and i p we can infer i n , so when HB is fixed, the interpretation i is simply represented as its true part i p .
We can now assign a truth value to any DNF or CNF formula from an Herbrand interpretation i based on the Herbrand base HB :
is TRUE under i iff it exists a substitution θ grounding (l 1 ∧… ∧ l m ) in such a way that each ground literal l k θ i s TRUE under i
• a DNF formula ∃ d 1 ∨… ∨ ∃d q is true under i iff at least one cube∃d j is TRUE under i.
• Any DNF or CNF formula that cannot be computed as TRUE under i is FALSE under i.
Consider for instance the Herbrand interpretation i defined above. The existentially quantified cube c= ∃x (light(x) ∧ green(x)) is true under i since the substitution θ = {x/b} grounds c and light(b) and green(b) are true under i.
A Herbrand interpretation i built on HB and under which a formula f is true is called a [Khardon, 1999] with as a motivation the extension of learnability results and methods to first order languages.
In concept learning from interpretations, there are basically two classes of hypotheses in investigation:
• The hypothesis corresponds to a theory i.e. a conjunction of facts and rules. Each rule holds on all positive examples, and each negative example should contradict the theory.
For instance each clause in H= {square(X) ← light(X); light(X) ←white(X)} holds on the two positive examples {square(a), light(a)} and {square(a),white(a), light(a)}, and H contradicts the negative example {light(a)} as H implies that any light object should also be square. The theory is then a CNF formula. CLAUDIEN [De Raedt and Dehaspe, 1997] , and, in the case of attribute-value representations, CHARADE [Ganascia, 1993] are examples of this first learning situation often referred to as "descriptive" learning, and In what follows we make no assumptions regarding the class of formulas allowed as hypotheses. However within most examples illustrating the ideas presented below, our hypotheses will be DNF formulas. We also will discuss in §4.4 to what extent CNF formulas can be learned using algorithms designed to learn DNF formulas and vice versa.
Learning from complete examples
Hereafter we will suppose that examples and hypothesis are built from a set of predicates P, a n d that a specific domain H U k , i.e. a specific Herbrand universe representing observed entities, is associated with each example. More precisely the example i k is a Herbrand interpretation based on the Herbrand base HB k that is built from HU k and P.
Example 1
Let P={light(.), red(.), green(.), brighter(.,.)} be a set of predicates.
Our first example is made of two light objects so : HU 1 = {a, b} and as a consequence
We know that the red one is brighter than Note that compatible I -is defined as not compatible I + : a unique relation Cover defined as "H covers the example i iff i is a model of H" is sufficient to define the solutions H in the usual way:
H is a solution iff:
H covers all positive examples and no negative example.
This relation is illustrated in the following Figure 1 1 In example1, the clause ∀x light(x) ( "all objects of the example are light ") covers the first example and does not cover the second one.
Classifying a new (complete) instance w.r.t the selected definition H is straightforward in learning from interpretations: either positive classification of i is consistent (i is a model of 1 We will figure the set of models M(H) of a hypothesis H as a rectangle, and the set of models M(e) of a formula e as an ellipse, moreover we will represent an interpretation by its name in bold characters.
negative classification is consistent (i is not a model of H). As a result a new instance i
is classified either as positive or as negative.
In order to extend concept learning from interpretations, we will both change the representation of the examples, and instantiate the compatibility relations.
Learning from Generalized examples
A constraint stronger than one corresponding to a complete example is obtained by generalizing the example. A generalized example is a clausal theory e to which is associated a Herbrand base HB. Each model built on HB of e acts on the solution space as a complete example. Generalized examples express the idea that only part of the (complete) observed example is sufficient to state that the example satisfies (or does not satisfies) the target concept. Let us suppose, for instance, that we learn the target-concept fly about birds using various attributes including color attributes, and suppose that when dealing with a migratory bird, the color is unrelated to the target concept. This means that whether we encounter a migratory bird as a positive example we have to describe it as a generalized positive example.
More precisely all instances whose differences from the positive example only concern colors, should also be covered by the definition of the target concept. In the same way, if our migratory bird represents a negative example of our target concept, then we will describe it as a generalized negative example, and, as a consequence, no example identical to the negative example, except concerning its color, should be covered by the definition of the target concept.
Thus the compatibility relation pair compatible G is defined as follows: As illustrated in Figure 2 , the positive constraint means that H covers each complete example within e + , whereas the negative constraint means that H does not cover any complete example within e -.
Example 2
Suppose we have a propositional language defined by the atomic propositions P = {bird, light, red, green} Let e -= {bird ; ← light} represent a generalized negative example. Here again we do not state the color of the object, therefore e -has again 4 models:
and H is also compatible with e -(no model of e -is a model of H).
Note that the literal red appears in H, possibly allowing H to be compatible with some other positive example, in which color is relevant.
A generalized example represents a set of complete examples that all have to be compatible with the hypothesis. As a consequence Monotonicity of Elimination is inherited from the case of complete examples.
Learning and classification settings are obtained from our generic learning setting using the compatibility relation pairs defined above. Now considering generalized instances, what is the intended meaning of a generalized instance? Suppose that concerning migratory birds we know that their class does not depend on their color. This means that the selected concept definition should classify such a migratory bird, thus considered as a generalized instance, in the same class whatever we know about its color.
Here contradictory classification appears whenever neither positive classification nor negative classification is consistent with our concept definition H . As a consequence our concept definition is no more satisfactory.
In our previous example suppose that we selected the hypothesis H = bird ∧ red, and that we have to classify the generalized instance e = {bird; migratory};
the generalized instance is classified as contradictory: we intended that the classification of our instance should not depend on the color of migratory birds, and it does depend on their color.
In other words generalized examples offers a way to use unlabeled examples to reject a hypothesis, and so to shrink the solution space.
Finally, we should mention that a generalized example is not always related to one observation, and so to one particular Herbrand Base, but may represent some piece of background knowledge . For instance the following generalized positive example:
means that whenever all entities in an instance are birds then it should be classified as A more general case arises when we face both uncertainty and generalization, i.e. when we don't know all that would be sufficient to relate our example to the target concept. The most general situation we can think of has the two following properties: 1) uncertainty in our observation is such that we do not know which description amongst several possible descriptions correspond to our observation, and 2) each description represents what we should know about our observation for our learning purpose.
Imagine for instance that we observe a robot, which is a positive example of the concept Task1. Also suppose that the arm of the robot is hidden and that either the arm holds a yellow hammer or it holds a screwdriver and a screw. Furthermore we know that in the later case the color of the screwdriver does not matter as we do not need any more information to consider the robot as a positive example of Task1. So our example e + will be represented by two possible generalized examples P 1 and P 2 . Both P 1 and P 2 .include a set of clauses B that represents background knowledge asserting, for instance, that the same object cannot be both a hammer and a screwdriver: Note that the subdomain defining the description of the robot depends on the "possibility" P under consideration (i.e. HU(P 1 ) ={a,b}and HU(P 2 ) ={a,b,c})
We can think of P 1 as a complete example (a particular case of generalized example) in which the arm of the robot only holds a hammer. Hence only constants a and b are used to describe the example. P 2 is a generalized example, as we do not mention the color of the screwdriver (it could be yellow, but it does not matter).
To be compatible with our uncertain-generalized example, a hypothesis has to be compatible with P 1 or compatible with P 2 . For instance H = ∃XY Holds(X,Y)∧Screw(Y) is compatible + with e + as H is compatible G + with P 2 . In other words, H is compatible with the positive example because, under the assumption that the hidden arm of the robot holds a screwdriver and a screw, asserting P 2 is sufficient to state that H is satisfied, and so H is an acceptable definition for the target concept.
So we propose to represent an uncertain generalized example as a set e = { P 1 , ...P n } o f consistent formulas, where each P i stands for a "possible" generalized example.
In Learning from Possibilities, the compatibility relation pair compatible P is so defined as follows:
Definition (Compatibility in learning from Possibilities):
-H is compatible P + with the example e + ={P 1 , ...P n } iff 
Monotonicity of Elimination is preserved in Learning from Possibilities as any new
information concerning an uncertain-generalized example e results in eliminating some possibility P i from e.
Regarding classification of uncertain-generalized examples, our generic classification setting depends on consistency of positive and negative classification. Contradictory classification occurs when there is neither a possibility P i the models of which are all models of H, nor a possibility P j of e that contains no models of H. Uncertain classification occurs when there is both a possibility P i the models of which are all models of H, and a possibility P j of e that Whenever e = {P 1 } contains one single possibility P i that has exactly one model built on the Herbrand base HB associated to e, then e represents a complete example as defined in §3.1.
c) Pure uncertain examples
Whenever e = {P 1 , ...P n } and each possibility P i has exactly one model built on a unique
Herbrand base HB associated to e, then e corresponds to a set of interpretations on HB. Each of these interpretations refers to one possible identity of the observed example. Such a pure uncertain example often corresponds to a formula of L whose models on HB are enumerated in e. If we also denote as e this formula we obtain the following definition of compatibility: there is no drawback in ignoring uncertainty in negative examples. In the other hand, the ILP learning settings that are reformulated are all related to the so-called "ILP normal setting" whose purpose is to derive positive examples and avoid deriving negative examples. Again a single "cover" relation is sufficient to reformulate these learning settings in which basically all the useful knowledge about examples is supposed to be known.
Another point in which our framework differs from learning from satisfiability, is that
Learning from satisfiability represents hypotheses as clausal theories when one of our practical purpose is to extend DNF as found in propositional learning to existential first order DNF. Finally we should note that learning from satisfiability does not explicitly discuss the 
4.3
Learning from satisfiability reduces to learning from possibilities
In [De Raedt, 1997 ] the author shows that the main concept learning settings, as learning from interpretations and learning by entailment reduce to (i.e. may be seen, after applying a transformation, as special cases of) "learning from satisfiability" and that learning from satisfiability does not reduce to these learning settings. 
The same proposition is false in learning from satisfiability, but it's true in learning from possibilities:
Proposition 4: Let P represents learning from possibilities then Sol P (L, E) = Sol P (not-L, not-E) .
Proof: Let H be an element of L that belongs to Sol P (L, E=E + ,E -). This means that 1) for any element e of E + it exists p ∈ e such that : p |=H and 2) for any element e of E -it exists p ∈ e such that p ∧ H |= .
If we switch the labels of elements of E + , then the elements( e, positive) of E + are transformed as not( e, positive )=(e, negative). We have then not(E+)=E '-and following 1) for any element e of E '- , it exists p ∈ e such that p |=H and so p ∧ ¬H|= , i.e. all negative elements in E`-are compatible P -with not-H.
In the same way by transforming elements of E -as not(e, negative )=(e, positive) we obtain not(E -)=E' + and following 2) for any element e of E' + , it exists p ∈ e such that p ∧ ¬ H|= and so p |=¬H, i.e. all positive elements in E' + are compatible P + with ¬H. Now Learning from Interpretations and Learning from satisfiability are both particular cases of Learning from Possibilities. More precisely they both correspond to reductions (see §5.3) in which the labels of the examples are unchanged. So we are interested in characterizing the reductions for which proposition 4 is true. A quick look at the proof above shows that the proof holds as far as the compatibility relations have the following property: for any example e, H is Compatible + with e iff ¬H is Compatible -with e. As long as a reduction of Learning from Possibilities preserves this property, Proposition 4 holds. This is the case in particular of
Assumptions Based learning described in the next section.
Local Knowledge and background Knowledge.
From a theoretical point of view both background knowledge and local knowledge concerning a given uncertain-generalized example may be freely included in the representation of the example as a clausal theory. So there is no theoretical issue related to background or local knowledge in Learning from Possibility. However Learning from Possibility is a very general learning setting and we will discuss the role of background and local knowledge on the more specific learning setting presented in the next section.
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Assumptions based learning
We discuss here a specific case (i.e. a reduction) of Learning from Possibilities. Let us suppose that we face a concept learning problem in which each example is uncertain and that we have some information that we can use to shrink uncertainty, but that we do not want to use to learn the target concept. This simply means that our inductive bias defines how each example should be described but that we need some extra information to reduce our uncertainty about the examples. Such an example is then denoted as an extended uncertain example.
More formally we associate to an uncertain extended example a clausal theory e. The formula e represents our state of knowledge on the example and is associated to an extended Herbrand base HBe such that we only consider models of e built on HBe as possible representations of the example. However the intended complete description of the example for our learning task should be an interpretation built on only a part HB of HB e . HB is also a Herbrand base built from less constants and predicates than HB e . H B is denoted as a subbase of H B e . So the extended uncertain example is defined as the clausal theory e together with the extended Herbrand base HB e and with the Herbrand subbase HB.
Example 3.a
Let HB ={light, white, square} and H B e = {light, white, polygon, square} expressing that the complete description of the positive example e relies on the truth values of light, white and square, and that we also use the truth value of polygon to help reducing the uncertainty concerning the truth value of light, white and square: e ={light ; polygon←square; ←polygon∧ white}
Here we know that our example can't be a white polygon, so it can't be both light and square. This results in the two following possible descriptions of the example for our learning purpose:
{light, white} {light, square}
Note that as in learning from possibilities the interpretations built on HB have to assign a truth value to hypotheses. So all predicates (and possibly constants) appearing in a hypothesis have to appear in all Herbrand bases HB associated to extended uncertain examples.
We give hereunder various definitions and notations before formally defining Assumptions
Based Learning:
An interpretation j on the subbase HB of HB e is called a partial interpretation: no truth-value is assigned to atoms of HB e -HB.
An interpretation i on HB e is an extension of an interpretation j on HB iff j p ⊆ i p and j n ⊆ i n .
Conversely j is the projection of i on HB. We will denote as ext(j) the set of all extensions of j on HB e .
An interpretation j built on HB is a partial model of a formula f iff at least one interpretation in ext(j) is a model of f.
Let j be an interpretation built on HB and such that j p = {t 1 ,..,t m } and j n = { f 1 ,...,f n }. Then we note ct(j) = ct(j p ) ∧ ct(j n ) the clausal theory containing the positive clauses (ct(j p )= {t 1 ;..;t m }) and the negative clauses (ct(j n )= {f 1 ←;...;f n ←}) representing the true and false ground atoms of j. Note that the interpretation j is the single model of ct(j) built on H B , and that ext(j)
represents the models of ct(j) built on HB e . Now given an extended example e, the possible complete examples are the partial models j (built on HB) of e. Here ct(j) represents all the positive and negative literals that are logical consequences of e plus a set of assumptions on the truth-value of the remaining atoms of HB.
Note that when HB = HB e , extended examples simply are pure uncertain examples as defined in. §2.2.1.
Example 3-b
The hypothesis H = white∧ square is not compatible A + with the positive example e since (see example 3-a) the only partial models of e are {light, white} and {light, square}, and none of them is a model of white∧ square.
This should not be confused with inductive biases on the hypothesis language. In the previous example we could have considered the example as a pure uncertain example, represented using the base H B e , and stating that an inductive bias exclude polygon of the hypothesis language. However such an approach is inaccurate if the desired representation HB contains fewer constants than the extended representation HB e as shown in the following example:
Example 4
We search for an hypothesis built on the unary predicates P ={light, white, square}.
In order to reduce uncertainty about an example describing a single object a, we use a binary predicate Near together with information concerning a second object b, so we have: This means that the object a cannot be both square and white as a is near an other object b.
We have then two partial models of e built on HB: j p1 ={light(a), white(a)} j p2 ={light(a), square(a)}
The point is that we need information concerning the object b in order to reduce the uncertainty about the object a: if we only consider information concerning a, we have a third partial model of e on HB, namely {light(a), white(a), square(a)} that cannot be the correct description of our example.
Assumptions based learning is a special case of learning from possibilities. More precisely Assumptions based learning reduces to learning from possibilities in such a way that labels of examples are preserved by the data transformation. Let us consider an uncertain extended example e, the corresponding uncertain-generalized example e p = {P 1 ,...,P u } is such that each P k is the clausal theory ct(j k ) corresponding to one partial model j k of e built on HB. So e p describe all possible complete examples intended when defining the uncertain extended example e.
In Example 4 the uncertain extended example e is thus translated as:
e p = { P 1 ={light(a) ; white(a); ← square(a)}, P 2 = {light(a) ; ← white(a); square(a)} }
Assumptions based learning of DNF+.
We investigate here the properties of Assumptions based learning when hypotheses are DNF+ formulas as for instance:
(all literals in the formula are positive literals).
Definition: Order on interpretations
Consider two interpretations j 1 and j 2. We will say that j 1 is smaller (respectively greater) than j 2 iff j 1p ⊆ j 2p (respectively j 1p ⊇ j 2p ).
For our learning purpose we are interested in partial models of e on H B . Such an interpretation is denoted as:
a maximal partial model of e on HB, when no greater interpretations on HB are partial models of e.
a minimal partial model of e on HB, when no smaller interpretations on HB are partial models of e..
Proposition 5
Let H be a DNF+ hypothesis and e be a clausal theory representing an is a minimal partial model of e on HB that is not a model of H.
As a consequence we only need to check maximal partial models of e built on HB when e is a positive example. Also we only need to check minimal partial models of e built on HB when e is a negative example.
Furthermore searching partial models of e corresponds to a combinatorial search whose tests can be made efficient if we only need positive assumptions. The following proposition shows that this is the case when considering positive examples:
Proposition 6 -H is compatible A + with the extended uncertain positive example e iff there exists an interpretation j built on HB such that:
ct(j p ) ∧ e |≠ HB) and j is a model of H (proof is given appendix A.5)
Note that negative assumptions are completely useless here, as checking whether an interpretation j is a model of a DNF+ hypothesis is also performed only considering the positive part j p of the interpretation j.
Unfortunately when considering negative examples the corresponding property (i.e. replacing "positive" by "negative" and "j is a model of H" by "j is not a model of H" in Proposition 6 ) is not true. Note however that whenever e -is a Horn clausal theory, then there is only one minimal model, namely the Herbrand minimal model, whose positive ground atoms are the ones that are logical consequences of e.
This means that we can just forget assumptions when considering negative examples and in this case the combinatorial search is useless:
Proposition 7 -Let e -be a negative extended example represented as a Horn clausal theory, let HBe be the associated Herbrand Base, and let HB ⊆ HBe be the Herbrand base used for learning. 
A DNF + hypothesis H is compatible
Constructing hypotheses with set covering methods
Consider for instance a concept learning algorithm that uses the standard greedy set covering algorithm searching for a DNF + formula: a first conjunction h 1 is selected that covers part of the positive examples and no negative examples, then a second one h 2 is selected that covers all the uncovered positive examples and no negative instances, then H = h 1 ∨ h 2 is output as the solution. However, in our uncertainty setting, we should verify that for each negative example e -there is at least one model of e -that makes both h 1 and h 2 compatible with the negative example. In other words we should first check compatibility of h 1 with e -, then compatibility of h 1 ∨ h 2 with e -and so on.
Example 5
Consider the DNF+ formula H = square ∨ light, and suppose that h 1 =square is If H and h are both compatible A with e then the DNF+ H∨ h is compatible A with e.
(proof is given appendix A.7)
5.3
The role of local Knowledge and background Knowledge in assumptions based learning.
Here background knowledge as local knowledge is included in the clausal theory e representing our state of knowledge about an uncertain extended example. Let us denote an uncertain extended example as e = F e ∧ K e where F e represents the facts concerning the example, i.e. positive and negative ground literals of H B e , and where K e represents clauses representing either rules or constraints. K e is divided into the Background Knowledge B that holds for all examples, and L e that represents the local knowledge, i.e. clauses and constraints that specifically hold for the example represented as e . For instance in example 4,
Now in the definition of compatible A we have the following (rewritten) condition : … "iff there exists an interpretation j built on HB such that: ct(j) ∧ F e ∧B ∧ L e |≠ HBe " So here knowledge helps to establish the set of interpretations j built on HB that do not contradict the facts F e and the knowledge K e . Such an interpretation j is so made of facts in F built on HB plus assumptions, consistent with F e ∧ K e , on truth-values of the other atoms of HB.
Furthermore background and local Knowledge can be used in order to make efficient the computation of these interpretations. The idea is that we can make assumptions on a subset
HBa of HBe different from HB: we use then the background and local Knowledge in order to deduce the truth value of ground atoms describing the possible complete examples. This results in the following variant of Assumptions Based Learning :
Let HB a be the part of HB e on which assumptions are made. Then H is compatible with an example e whether:
There exists an interpretation a on HB a such that:
ct(a) ∧ e|≠ HBe and ct(a) ∧ e |= HBe ct( j) where j is an interpretation built on HB, and j is a model of H, if e is a positive example, or j is not a model of H, if e is a negative example.
Deduction should be complete i.e. all partial models j of e built on HB should be deducible from assumptions on HBa.
In section §5.4.2 we exemplify this variant on our RNA problem.
5.4
RNA secondary structure prediction in assumptions based learning framework 5.4.1 RNA secondary structures RNA secondary structure prediction is a molecular biology problem that we have represented in the framework of assumptions based learning from Horn clauses.
A RNA molecule corresponds to a sequence of nucleotides and forms a three-dimensional structure. The RNA secondary structure is a simpler representation characterizing the main biological properties of the molecule and consists in a bi-dimensional conformation of helices (regions where the stretch of RNA forms spirals). In most cases the secondary structure is unknown and the RNA sequence is used to predict the secondary structure. In this work we use the fact that a RNA sequence contains occurrences of lexical patterns called palindromes from which we can predict a set of possible secondary structures: a helix of the secondary structure always corresponds to a palindrome of the sequence but the converse can be false.
So the prediction of the secondary structure from an RNA sequence comes to identifying and describing the subset of palindromes that corresponds to the set of helices.
To describe a possible secondary structure we use the three following structural binary relations (as illustrated Figure 5 ) defined on pair of palindromes:
Includes (I).
(1) P(p 1 ,p 2 ) (2) O(p 1 ,p 2 ) (3) I(p 1 ,p 2 ) Figure 5 : (1), (2) and (3) are the three structural relations between two palindromes p 1 and p 2 .
Additional biological information helps to determine the subset of palindromes corresponding to helices and thus representing the structure of a RNA sequence. In particular two palindromes can be structurally incompatible and as a consequence cannot both represent h e l i c e s . Furthermore the set of helices corresponds to one of the maximal subsets of compatible palindromes. Here examples are positive uncertain extended examples as found in our assumptions based learning framework: we need incompatibility information to reduce uncertainty, but regarding learning we only need atoms describing structural relations: o An example e is then a Horn clausal theory that contains the general constraint of incompatibility of palindromes, structural and incompatibility relations between palindromes. HB e is the Herbrand Base of this clausal theory.
o The part HB of HB e only contains the ground atoms describing the structural relations.
However, as incompatibility concerns palindromes and not structural relations the most natural and efficient way to investigate the various possible structures is first to investigate the maximal subsets of compatible palindromes, and then to deduce the corresponding grounded structural relations. This corresponds to assumptions based learning using background and local knowledge as discussed in §5.3
Example 7
Consider the palindromes given Figure 6 .
The base on which assumptions will be made is:
The base HB on which possible complete examples are described is formed from the predicates O, I, P corresponding to the structural relations, and from the constants {a,b,c,d,e} representing the palindromes observed in the sequence. The base HBe on which extended examples are represented includes HB, HBa and the ground atoms built on the incompatibility relation # .
-#(b,c)← means that the palindromes p 1 and p 2 are not compatible.
is the clause defining that two incompatible palindromes cannot be both helices.
When we observe two palindromes p 1 and p2 on the sequence, we also observe the corresponding structural relation R(p 1 , p 2) under the assumption that both p 1 and p2 are helices. This corresponds to the clause R(p 1 , p 2 )← hel(p 1 ) ∧ hel (p 2 ) . where R is one of the three structural relations O, I, P.
An example e = is then represented as the clause that define incompatibility together with the structural information and incompatibilities: e = F e ∧B ∧ L e where
We don't represent here negative facts concerning structural relations as ← O(a,b), . In our application we use a particular property of our RNA problem: for each sequence we can rank structures and keep only few of the most probable structures with a weak probability to reject the correct . A negative example e -is a generalized example: no instance satisfies the target concept.
Although Dietterich does not actually present this setting in a logical framework we can formalize it in the following way: consider that each instance of an example e is an interpretation, then e is the formula which models are these interpretations.
The framework is then similar to Learning from satisfiability: positive examples are uncertain, negative ones are generalized. However in multiple-instance problems, the examples (and hypotheses) are expressed in propositional (or attribute-value) representations. Such a learning setting is useful when the learning task concerns multiple realities rather than uncertainty. In the application that motivated multiple instance learning, the concept target was the activity of a drug, each example was a molecule that could take various 3-dimensional conformations, so each instance was one of these conformations. But during the Zucker, 1998] , [Zucker and Ganascia 1998 ], and in various attempts to propositionalize first order learning problems in order to use variants of efficient propositional or attribute-value learners [Alphonse and Rouveirol, 2000] , [Sebag et al, 1996] . The basic idea is that an object described using a first order representation, i.e. a relational description, can be reduced, starting from some basic pattern, to multiple parts or multiple views corresponding to various matches with a given pattern. As a consequence not only multiple instance or multiple part learning and propositionalization do not deal with uncertainty, but multiple instances as single instances can be uncertain. Note however that in this case, we should take care of dependencies between assumptions.
Hirsh's settings
3 see also [Auer, 1997 ; Maron and Lozano-Perez, 1998] 5 More precisely a boolean function i is associated with each example e: if e is positive ∃inst ∈ e such that f(inst) = true, and if e is negative ∀inst ∈ e, f(inst) = false.
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Extending the work of T. Mitchell [Mitchell, 1982] , H. Hirsh introduced Version-Space
Merging [Hirsh, 1994] least one is correct (e.g. a bird is light and migratory and we guess that either "bird and light" or "bird and migratory" is sufficient to conclude on the target concept).
This situation can be addressed in our learning from possibilities setting by considering examples as both uncertain and generalized.
6.3
Uncertainty in propositional or attribute-value representations.
Uncertainty in propositional or attribute-value representations is often denoted as the "missing values" problem. There are basically two approaches: either predicting the complete description or taking into account the missing values when scoring the hypotheses. The former approach supposes that one possible identity of the example is much more "probable" than others and that such accurate prediction is possible. Then simple methods compute a most probable value for each missing value, possibly using some simple Bayesian scheme, where most sophisticated methods attempt to learn from examples to predict the missing values [Liu et al, 1997] . In the later approach all possible identities are in some sense considered, as the scoring function to optimize when searching a preferred solution is weighted according to the probability distribution of the possible values for uncertain attributes [Quinlan, 1993] .The latter approach could not be used here since in our RNA application all values were missing, so we had to use knowledge about the relations between attribute-values. The former one, selecting only one possible identity was also not adequate (as the most probable RNA structure generally is not the true one).
6.4
Abduction and Induction in Inductive Logic Programming.
Regarding first order representations, uncertainty has been addressed in works on abduction and induction (see [Dimopoulos and Kakas, 1996; Kakas and Riguzzi, 1997] 
Conclusion
We have discussed in this paper logical learning settings dealing with incomplete examples.
We have identified two basic kind of incompleteness uncertainty and abstraction and we have Kleer, 1986] . Indeed in ABL a hypothesis is compatible with an uncertain example provided that some assumptions concerning the truth-value of ground atoms are allowed, and, as in ATMS, we have to deal in ABL with the various sets of assumption that support the hypothesis. This suggests that incremental ABL learners could benefit from ATMS techniques.
Appendix A -Proofs
In the proofs mentioned hereafter we will consider two Herbrand bases HB and HBs ⊆ HB from which interpretations can be formed and an hypothesis H = ∃h 1 ∨ ∃h 2 …∨ ∃h n (a DNF + formula) formed from predicates (and possibly the set of constants) mentioned in HB.
A.1: Lemmas
Let us first consider following Lemmas, which will be used in the proofs below.
Lemma 1
Let j be a model of H, then an interpretation i greater than j is a model of H.
Proof : j is a model of H means that there is a substitution θ, grounding at least one h k , such that all grounded atoms of h k θ belongs to j p . Then, all grounded atoms of h k θ belong to i p as
Lemma 2
Let j be an interpretation that is not a model of H, then any interpretation i smaller than j is not a model of H.
Lemma 3
Let j be an interpretation built on HBs and tc(j) its associated clausal theory.
An interpretation j' on HB is a model of tc(j) iff j' is an extension of j on HB.
Proof :Let j p = {t 1 , ..,t m } and j n = {f 1 ,…,f m } be the sets of respectively true and false grounded atoms of HB in j. . Then tc(j) = {t 1 , ..,t m , ←f 1 ,…,←f m }.
"⇒"Let j' be a model of tc(j).built on H. Then j' is a model of each single grounded clause c of tc(j). If c is a positive literal then necessarily j' p contains c. If c is a negative literal ← f, then necessarily j' n contains f. Thus j' assigns to all atoms of j the truth-value they have in j, and so j'is an extension of j.
"⇐" As j' is an extension of j, then j' p ⊇ j p and j' n ⊇ j n . As a consequence j' is a model of each single grounded clause of tc(j).
A.2: Proof of Proposition 1
Let us consider a learning set under learning from satisfiability Es = Es + ∪ E S -,. Following De
Raedt's notations we will consider that any example of E S is written as (c, class) where c is the clausal theory that represents this example, and class is either positive (if e ∈ Es In consequence ρ maps Es onto a set E P = E P + ∪ E P -. Then we have to prove that:
Sol(E S ) (under compatibleS) = Sol(E P ) (under compatibleP), where these solution sets are defined as :
Sol(E S ) = {H | ∀(c, positive) ∈ E S + , H ∧ c |≠ , and ∀(c, negative) ∈ E S -H ∧ c |= } Sol(E P ) = {H | ∀(C, positive)∈ E P + , H is compatible P + C, and ∀(C,negative) ∈ E P -, H is compatible P -with C}
The proof is as follows:
( (2) Let (c, negative) an example of Es -a n d ρ((c, negative)) = ({c}, negative) the corresponding example of E P -then H ∧ c |= ⇔ ∃pi=c ∈ {c} such that pi ∧ H |= ⇔ H is compatible P -with {c}
A.3: Proof of Proposition 2
We provide a counter-example. Let us suppose that E P + contains only the following positive example e p = {{a},{b}} and let E P -=Ø. The concept space contains the clausal theories built from the 0-ary predicates a and b. Then H is compatible P + e p means that ∃ pi ∈ {{a},{ b}} such that pi |= H , i.e. (1) a |= H or b |= H.
Suppose a reduction ρ that maps E P = {(e p , positive ) } onto E S containing the example {(C, class)} where C is a consistent clausal theory and class is either positive or negative. Then a solution H to the corresponding learning from satisfiability problem should either satisfy (2) or ( Let I = {∅, {a}, {b}, {a, b}} be the set of all Herbrand interpretations. We denote as True the formula whose set of models is I.
We first observe that class cannot be negative as H=true satisfies (1) but does not satisfy (3)
for any consistent clausal theory C.
Suppose now that class = positive. As neither H=¬a nor H =¬b satisfy (1), they must not satisfy (2) and in consequence C |=a and C |=b. We conclude that C has one single model that is {a,b}. We observe that for such a formula C, H = a ∧ b satisfies (2) but does not satisfy
(1) and this contradicts our initial assumption. The corollaries a) and b) are obvious.
A.5: Proof of Proposition 6
⇒ : H is compatible A + with e means that there is a partial model k of e built on HB and such that ct(k p ) ∧ ct(k n ) ∧ e|≠ . Clearly k is also such that ct(k p ) ∧ e|≠ .
⇐ : Let us consider a model k of ct(j p )∧e built on HB. Then k can be written as m + n, where m contains the atoms belonging to HB and n contains the atoms belonging to HBe-HB. Then m = m p + m n , and as k is a model of ct(j p ) , then m p ⊇ j p .
The interpretation m built on HB is so such that :
• m is a model of H (because m is greater than j and j is a model of H (see Lemma 1))
• ct(m p ) ∧ ct(m n ) ∧ e|≠ (because m is included in k which is a model of e).
A.6: Proof of Proposition 7
Let m be the least Herbrand model of e -, and pm be its projection on HB.
"⇐" Suppose pm is not a model of H , then H is compatible with e -if ct(pm)∧e -|≠ HBe .
According to Lemma 3 ("⇐") m is a model of ct(pm). As m is also a model of e -then H is compatible with e -.
"⇒" Suppose that H is compatible with e -thanks to an interpretation j of HB. Then j is not a model of H and ct(j) has a model j' on HBe which is a model of e -. According to Lemma 3 ("⇒"), j' is an extension of j.
Consider now the following inclusions :
• pm p ⊆ j' p , because pm p ⊆ m p (as m is an extension of pm) and m p ⊆ j' p (as j' is greater than m, like all models of e -)
• j p ⊆ j' p (as j' is an extension of j)
As j determines the truth-value of all atoms of HB, then j' p -j p is only made of true atoms of HBe-HB. Suppose now that pm is a model of H on HB. In such a case as pm p ⊆ j' p, then pm p ⊆ j p . Actually each atom of pm p is in HB so it cannot be in j' p -j'. Then, according to Lemma 1 j is a model of H, which contradicts the initial assumption that j is not a model of H. In consequence pm p (actually pm) is not a model of H.
A.7 : Proof of proposition 8
Let e + be a Horn clausal theory representing a positive extended uncertain example. H is compatible with e + means that there is a model k of H built on HB and such that tc(k) has a model built on HBe that is a model of e + . According the laws of logics k is also a model of H ∨ h, so H ∨ h is compatible with e + .
Let now e -be a Horn clausal theory representing a negative extended uncertain example. e -has a unique least Herbrand model m on HBe, and we will call pm its projection on HB.
As demonstrated in proposition 7, H is compatible with e -entails that pm is not a model of H.
As h is compatible with e -, for the same reason pm is not a model of h.
So we observe that H ∨ h is compatible with e -: a) pm is not a model of H ∨ h (pm would then be a model of H ∨ h such that pm was a model of H or pm was a model of h, which as previously been proved as false).
b) ct(pm) is a model of e -: m is the extension of pm in HBe and therefore is a model of ct(pm) built on HBe (see Lemma 3 ("⇐")).
